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Abstract
This paper studies the °ow-performance relationship of three di®erent investor
groups in mutual funds: Households, ¯nancial corporations, and insurance compa-
nies and pension funds, establishing the following ¯ndings: Financial corporations
have a strong tendency to chase past performance and also hold an increased share
in the top performing funds. Insurance companies and pension funds show some
evidence of performance chasing, but are underrepresented in the best performing
funds. Households chase performance, but they are also subject to status quo bias
in their °ows. Regarding investor composition the worst performing funds show
no signi¯cant di®erence in their investor structure when compared to funds with
average performance.
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Mutual fund investors chase past performance, even though performance is not persistent
over time. On the other hand, investors are reluctant to withdraw their money from the
worst performing funds (see e.g. Sirri & Tufano 1998, Carhart 1997). This behavior has
often been attributed to the irrationality of mutual fund investors.
In contrast to behavioral explanations, Gruber (1996) and Berk & Green (2004) de-
velop a model in which investors rationally chase past performance. They assume that
fund managers possess di®erent levels of investment ability. Mutual funds' future perfor-
mance is thus partly predictable from past performance. Sophisticated investors realize
this and therefore rationally chase past performance. Since managerial ability is assumed
to have decreasing returns to scale, a well performing manager will attract in°ows until
he or she is no longer able to outperform the market. By the same mechanism investors
leave poorly performing funds up to the point where the funds cease to underperform.
Thus, performance of mutual funds is not persistent, precisely because investors chase
past performance.
The worst performing mutual funds, however, keep performing poorly (see Carhart
1997). Arguing in the framework of Gruber (1996) and Berk & Green (2004) the persis-
tence of the worst performing funds is caused by the fact that some investors are unwilling
or hindered from withdrawing their money (see Berk & Tonks 2007). This cannot be cor-
rected by other investors, since they cannot short-sell mutual fund shares. The persistence
of the worst performing funds is therefore attributed to unsophisticated or disadvantaged
investor clienteles that do not withdraw their money from poorly performing funds. So
are there disadvantaged clienteles in mutual funds, and if so, who are they?
Using a unique data set, that allows the identi¯cation of di®erent investor groups in
mutual funds, this paper tries to address this question. The data set comes from the
Securities Deposits Statistics of the Deutsche Bundesbank, which record the depositors
of securities held in Germany. Through this information I am able to obtain the investorstructure of mutual funds. In particular, the data enables me to di®erentiate not only be-
tween retail and institutional investors, but also between di®erent institutional investors
such as ¯nancial corporations and insurance companies and pension funds. These in-
vestor groups are likely to di®er in their behavior. Financial corporations are arguably
the most sophisticated investors and should invest according to performance. The group of
private investors can include both sophisticated investors and unsophisticated investors.
Insurance companies and pension funds are ¯nancially sophisticated, but can be insti-
tutionally disadvantaged because of regulatory restrictions. By identifying these three
investor groups and analyzing their behavior within the same mutual fund I am able to
directly test hypotheses deduced from the Gruber (1996) and Berk & Green (2004) model.
The main ¯ndings of this paper are as follows: First, ¯nancial corporations show a
strong tendency to chase past performance, which is statistically and economically signif-
icant. The best performing funds experience in°ows of up to 31 percentage points higher
than the average fund. Consequently, the percentage of mutual fund shares held by ¯-
nancial corporations is higher for the best performing funds than for the average fund.
While ¯nancial corporations hold an average of 13 percent in mutual funds, they hold
about 18-19 percent in the best performing funds. The fact that ¯nancial corporations
chase past performance is telling, because ¯nancial corporations are probably the most
sophisticated investors and chasing past returns of mutual funds has often been attributed
to unsophisticated investors. Thus, the ¯nding that sophisticated investors chase perfor-
mance provides strong support for the theory proposed by Gruber (1996) and Berk &
Green (2004).
Second, there is some evidence that insurance corporations and pension funds are chas-
ing performance, although not as strongly as ¯nancial corporations. Moreover, insurance
companies and pension funds do not invest in all mutual funds in the sample. Insurance
companies and pension funds tend to invest in larger and older funds, funds with high
fees and less volatility, which results in the fact that insurance companies and pension
2funds only hold around 10-12 percent of shares in the top performing funds, while the
average share of this investor group is around 16 percent.
Third, evidence for retail investors is mixed. Households chase past winners to some
extent, but compared to ¯nancial corporations the in°ows to top performing funds are
considerably smaller in size. Top mutual funds only experience around 3 percentage
point higher in°ows than the average fund. Furthermore, retail °ows show a signi¯cant
¯rst-order autocorrelation, while both institutional investors - ¯nancial corporations, and
insurance companies and pension funds - do not. This result is robust for all speci¯cations
and economically meaningful. All other things being equal, a fund that experienced an
increase in retail °ows of 10 percentage points in the previous quarter grows in the current
quarter by an additional 2.6 percentage points. This autocorrelation pattern in retail
°ows can either be caused by unobserved fund characteristics, such as advertising and
distribution channels, savings plans or by status quo bias. Both °ows due to advertising
and status quo bias are associated with unsophisticated investors.
Finally, the paper investigates whether investor groups di®er in their behavior of pun-
ishing mutual fund managers by withdrawing their money from poorly performing funds.
There is some evidence that ¯nancial corporations punish the worst performing funds
by withdrawing their money. However, when looking at the percentage shares held by
the investor groups, the investor composition of the worst performing funds does not
systematically di®er from the investor composition of the average fund.
The remainder of the paper is structured as follows. Section 2 reviews the related
literature and develops the testable hypotheses. Section 3 describes the data set that is
used. Section 4 investigates the di®erences in the °ow-performance relationship of the var-
ious investor groups. Section 5 analyzes the investor composition subject to performance.
Section 6 concludes.
32 Related Literature and Hypotheses
A wealth of literature investigates the °ows of mutual fund investors as a response to past
performance. This °ow-performance relationship of investors in mutual funds has been
found to be convex (e.g. Ippolito 1992, Chevalier & Ellison 1997, Sirri & Tufano 1998):
mutual funds with high performance receive overproportional in°ows, while funds with
low performance experience only mild out°ows. Ber, Kempf & Ruenzi (2007) and Jank &
Wedow (2010) con¯rm this convex °ow-performance relationship for the German mutual
fund market.
There are several studies that investigate the °ow-performance relationship of mu-
tual funds in connection with investor heterogeneity. Christo®ersen & Musto (2002) ¯nd
heterogeneity among money market fund investors. On the one hand there is a group
of investors that is responsive to performance; on the other there are investors that do
not respond to bad performance by withdrawing their money. Investor heterogeneity can
therefore explain the cross-sectional fee dispersion among money market funds.
There is also evidence for investor heterogeneity in equity funds. Del Guercio & Tkac
(2002) ¯nd di®erent °ow-performance relationships among mutual and pension funds.
James & Karceski (2006) observe di®erences between investors in institutional and retail
funds and Chen, Yao & Yu (2007) ¯nd di®erences between the clientele of funds issued
by insurance and non-insurance companies. This paper contributes to the literature of
investor heterogeneity in mutual funds by directly analyzing the °ow-performance rela-
tionship of various investor groups within the same fund.
The main focus of this paper thus lies in testing a theory put forth by Gruber (1996)
and Berk & Green (2004). In their model they assume that mutual fund managers possess
di®erent investment abilities. Since mutual funds sell at net asset value, managerial ability
is not priced. A mutual fund with high management ability is therefore underpriced.
Sophisticated investors will realize this fact and buy (underpriced) well performing funds
and leave underperforming funds, while disadvantaged or unsophisticated investors stay
4behind. In the Berk & Green (2004) model managerial ability is subject to decreasing
economies of scale (see Chen et al. 2004). Thus, in°ows of sophisticated investors into top
performing funds continue until the size of the fund has increased up to the point where
the mutual fund manager is not expected to outperform the market. The ¯rst testable
hypothesis, as formulated by Gruber, is therefore:
Hypothesis 1: Sophisticated investors constitute a larger percentage of cash
°ows into and out of mutual funds than disadvantaged in-
vestors.
If sophisticated investors identify skilled fund managers faster than unsophisticated
investors and also leave poorly performing funds faster, this should also a®ect the stock
of funds held by the investor groups. The second testable hypothesis is therefore about
the percentage shares held by the di®erent investor groups. If sophisticated investors exit
poorly performing funds ¯rst, it will mostly be disadvantaged investors who stay behind.
This is what Berk & Tonks (2007) call a \burnout" in analogy to the mortgage backed
securities market. By the same argument the share of sophisticated investors will increase
in the funds that overperform. Thus, the second testable hypothesis is twofold (Gruber
1996):
Hypothesis 2a: Mutual funds that overperform contain a larger proportion of
sophisticated clientele than a fund with average performance.
Hypothesis 2b: Mutual funds that underperform contain a larger proportion of
disadvantaged clientele than a fund with average performance.
This gives rise to the following question: Which groups in a mutual fund are so-
phisticated, unsophisticated or disadvantaged? Gruber (1996) proposes the following
categorization, where mutual fund investors are divided into sophisticated and disadvan-
taged investors. Sophisticated investors are de¯ned as investors who invest according to
performance. The group of disadvantaged investors consists of the following sub-groups:
5First, there are unsophisticated investors, who are in°uenced by other factors besides
performance, such as advertising or brokerage advice. Second, there are institutionally
disadvantaged investors, who are restricted in their investment decisions by regulations.1
This study will test these key hypotheses by investigating the °ow-performance rela-
tionship and percentage holdings of three di®erent investor groups: Households, ¯nancial
corporations, and insurance companies and pension funds. If the theory by Gruber (1996)
and Berk & Green (2004) is correct, we should expect di®erences in the investor groups'
°ow-performance sensitivities. Financial corporations are arguably the most sophisti-
cated investors and should therefore have a strong °ow-performance sensitivity, i.e. they
should strongly chase performance and also heavily punish the worst performing funds
by withdrawing money. The degree of ¯nancial sophistication for households is unclear a
priori. Insurance companies and pension funds are ¯nancially sophisticated but compared
to other institutional investors they are disadvantaged, because regulations restrict what
they are able to invest in. In Germany insurance companies and pension funds are both
regulated by the same law, the Insurance Supervision Act (Versicherungsaufsichtsgesetz,
VAG), and are supervised by the Federal Financial Supervisory Authority (Bundesanstalt
fÄ ur Finanzdienstleistungsaufsicht, BaFin). This regulation requires insurance companies
and pension funds to verify that their investments in mutual funds comply with prudent-
man principles. The three investor groups consequently di®er in their decisions whether
to buy and sell mutual fund shares. The following section will describe the data set used
in this study.
1Furthermore, Gruber names tax disadvantaged investors, for whom the tax considerations make it
ine±cient to redeem their shares from a fund. The complication of the tax overhang caused by capital
gains tax (see e.g. Barclay et al. 1998) does not apply for Germany.
63 Data
3.1 Mutual Fund Data and Depositor Structure
The sample consists of mutual funds that are registered in Germany and are thus required
to report to the central bank, the Deutsche Bundesbank.2 The reporting data is the
main data set and contains, among other things information about the numbers of shares
outstanding, total net assets, buy and sell prices and dividends payed. The data set also
includes funds that have either ceased to exist or have merged with other funds and is
therefore survivorship-bias free. I only consider actively managed mutual funds that are
primarily o®ered to individuals, i.e. I omit index funds and funds that are exclusively for
institutional investors. To make funds comparable I only consider funds with a su±cient
number of funds in their peer group:3 funds that invest in Germany, Europe and funds
with a global investment objective. The information about the investment objective as
well as the total expense ratio was obtained from the German Federal Association of
Investment Companies (Bundesverband Deutscher Investmentgesellschaften, BVI).
The mutual fund data is matched with data from the Securities Deposits Statistics of
the Deutsche Bundesbank. Starting with the last quarter of 2005 the Securities Deposits
Statistics record data on the depositor structure of ¯nancial securities held in Germany.
The statistics give the amount of shares held by a certain depositor group in a ¯nancial
security or, in this case, in a mutual fund. I investigate three major investor groups:
Households, ¯nancial corporations, and insurance corporations and pension funds. Fi-
nancial corporations include credit institutions, other ¯nancial intermediaries such as
investment funds and ¯nancial auxiliaries and exclude insurance corporations and pen-
2There are a number of funds that are registered in Luxembourg and marketed in Germany. These
funds do not report to the Deutsche Bundesbank and are therefore not contained in the sample.
3I omit index funds, sector funds and foreign single-country funds.
7sion funds.4 For simplicity, the term ¯nancial corporations will always exclude insurance
companies and pension funds in the following analysis.
The Securities Deposits Statistics collect data from ¯nancial institutions in Germany
on the basis of a security-by-security reporting system. Financial institutions report the
number of shares of their customers or their own holdings in a mutual fund. These shares
are categorized into depositor groups by the ¯nancial institutions and then reported to
the Deutsche Bundesbank, which aggregates the data for each fund. Deviations between
the actual number of shares outstanding and the number of shares reported can either
be caused by shares that are held by depositors which are not reported (e.g. foreign
shareholders) or by double counting. For this reason I cross-check the aggregate number
of shares from the deposits statistics with the number of shares outstanding. Descriptive
statistics for the sample can be found in Table 1.
The table provides the number of funds in the sample and their investment objective
(Germany, Europe or Global). In addition it displays statistics of common mutual fund
characteristics. Finally, the table shows the number of funds for which information on
the investor structure is available. Coverage of the investor structure is around 60 to
70 percent for 2005 and 2006, but improved to around 90 percent for the years 2007
and 2008. Households hold the majority of assets, but their share decreased from 71
percent in 2005 to around 58 percent at the end of 2008. We see a growing importance of
institutional investors in mutual funds. Especially the group of insurance companies and
pension funds increased their value-weighted shares from 13 in 2005 to 22 in 2008. This
increase might re°ect the fact that since the reform of the statutory pension insurance
scheme in Germany in-company and private pension schemes are becoming more and
more important.
4Categorization according to the European System of Accounts (ESA 95): Households (ESA 95 code:
S.14), insurance corporations and pension funds (ESA 95 code: S.125), ¯nancial corporations include
credit institutions, other ¯nancial intermediaries and ¯nancial auxiliaries (ESA 95 code: S.122, S.123 and
S.124). The remaining group includes non-¯nancial corporations, central banks, general government, and
nonpro¯t institutions serving households (ESA 95 code: S.11, S.121, S.13 and S.15). For further details
see European Commission (1996) and Deutsche Bundesbank (2006).
83.2 Fund Flows
Since the data provides the number of shares being held by every investor group in each
quarter, the calculation of investor °ows is straightforward. The net °ow of depositor





where Sharesi;j;t is the amount of shares of fund i held by depositor group j in quarter
t. The total net °ow is simply calculated as the relative change in all outstanding shares.
Through this procedure I obtain total net °ows and °ows for each of the three investor
groups: Households, ¯nancial corporations, and insurance companies and pension funds.
Unusual °ows can occur for very new funds, when mergers take place or when a fund
closes down. To avoid these outliers I omit observations with a growth rate below and
above the 1st and the 99th percentile.
Following Keswani & Stolin (2008) I calculate time series averages of mean, standard
deviation and percentiles of all investor group °ows, which can be found in Table 2. Over-
all, there are weak out°ows from mutual funds in the sample period. While households
seem to withdraw money from mutual funds in the sample period, ¯nancial corporations,
and insurance companies and pension funds bought mutual fund shares. Furthermore, the
cross-sectional variance of institutional °ows is much larger than the variance of private
investors. In particular, ¯nancial corporations show the highest variation. This high vari-
ation of institutional °ows suggests that institutional investors move their money more
quickly into and out of mutual funds than retail investors do.
Table 3 shows time series averages of pairwise correlations of investor group °ows.
The average correlation between the °ows of the di®erent groups is surprisingly small.
Keswani & Stolin (2008) ¯nd a similarly low correlation between retail and institutional
investors. This low correlation points to the fact that di®erent investor groups behave
very di®erently when deciding whether to buy and sell funds.
93.3 Performance Measures
Performance is estimated using three measures, which are commonly reported for mutual
funds: Raw Return, Sharpe Ratio and Jensen's Alpha. Raw Returns are calculated
assuming that gross dividends are reinvested immediately. I calculate the Sharpe Ratio







where Ri is the monthly return of fund i and Rf the risk free rate measured by the
1-month EURIBOR. Last, I use the performance measure proposed by Jensen (1968).
Jensen's Alpha is estimated as follows:
Ri ¡ R
f = ®i + ¯i(R
m ¡ R
f); (3)
where Ri is again the return of fund i and Rf the risk free rate, again measured by
the 1-month EURIBOR, and Rm is the return of the market portfolio. The market
portfolio return is measured by the benchmark index for each investment objective. I use
the following three benchmark indices, which are generally used to evaluate these mutual
funds in their respective peer group: the MSCI Germany, MSCI Europe and MSCI Global
Index. The evaluation period for the performance measures is 24 months. Using shorter
or longer evaluation periods, such as 12 and 36 months, leads to similar results.
This study focuses on these performance measures, because they are easily available
for all investors. Information services such as Morningstar and others provide these on
a regular basis. The performance measures provided can therefore be seen as a signal
of managerial ability, which is available to all investors, institutional and private, at no
or only negligible costs. Thus, the focus of this paper is to answer the question of how
investors react to these observed performance measures by adjusting their °ows.
104 Flow-Performance Relationship
4.1 Flow-Performance Relationship of Di®erent Investor Groups
In order to estimate the °ow-performance relationship I run a piecewise-linear regression
(see Sirri & Tufano 1998, Huang et al. 2007). For each quarter mutual funds are ranked
within their investment objective according to their past performance, where performance
is measured by Raw Return, Sharpe Ratio and Jensen's Alpha over the past 24 months.
This rank is then normalized so that ranks are evenly distributed between zero and one,
where zero is assigned to the worst performing fund and one to the best performing fund.
Funds are then categorized into low, medium and high performing funds: low performing
funds include the lowest performance quintile, medium performing funds the three middle
performance quintiles and the high performing funds the highest performance quintile.
The three variables for the regression are de¯ned in the following way:
Lowi = Min(Ranki;0:20)
Midi = Min(Ranki ¡ Lowi;0:60) (4)
Highi = Ranki ¡ Midi ¡ Lowi;
where Ranki is the percentile rank of the fund. Thus, the coe±cients of Low, Mid and
High represent the piecewise decomposition of the percentile rank and can be interpreted
as the slope of the °ow-performance relationship within the performance range. The
regression model is speci¯ed as follows:
Flowi;j;t = ¯0 + ¯1Lowi;t¡1 + ¯2Midi;t¡1 + ¯3Highi;t¡1 (5)
+ ¯4Controlsi;t¡1 + "i;j;t;
where Flowi;j;t is the °ow of each investor group j in fund i at quarter t. Control
variables include volatility measured by the 24-month standard deviation of monthly
11returns, total expenses, fund size measured by the natural logarithm of total net assets,
and fund age measured by the natural logarithm of one plus age in years.5 For each
investor group I also include the °ow lagged by one quarter into the regression, since
mutual fund °ows show a pattern of autocorrelation. In addition, the regression includes
time dummies and dummies for the investment objectives, which are not reported.
The quarterly regression model is estimated using pooled OLS, since the sample's
time dimension is quite short and the Fama & MacBeth (1973) regression lacks su±cient
statistical power in such a setting. Standard errors are clustered at the fund level.
Table 4 shows the result of this regression for Raw Return, Sharpe Ratio and Jensen's
Alpha. For all performance measures I ¯nd a convex °ow-performance relationship in total
net °ows as can be seen in the ¯rst column of Panel A, B and C. Furthermore, the results
show signi¯cant ¯rst-order autocorrelation in mutual fund °ows. The remaining control
variables show the expected signs. Volatility in returns is negatively related to fund °ows,
even though only signi¯cant in one speci¯cation and total fees are also negatively related
to °ows. Size and age have no signi¯cant in°uence on °ows at the aggregate level. These
¯ndings are comparable to those for the US market (see e.g. Sirri & Tufano 1998, Chen
et al. 2007, Huang et al. 2007).
Looking at the disaggregate °ows, however, the three investor groups show pronounced
di®erences in their °ow-performance relationship in the high segment. Financial corpora-
tions have the highest °ow-performance sensitivity in this segment. The top performing
funds experience a 31 percentage point higher growth rate than funds in the middle section
(See Panel B). There is some evidence that the group of insurance companies and pension
funds chases past performance, but the coe±cient of the high segment is not statistically
signi¯cant for all performance measures. Moreover, households chase past performance,
although, the coe±cient is much smaller in size.
5Total expenses are measured by expense ratio + 1/3 total load. Since the average holding period
was 2 - 3 years in the sample I adjust the calculation of total fees as proposed by Sirri & Tufano (1998).
Note that Barber et al. (2005) ¯nd similar results for US mutual funds with an average holding period
of 30 months in the late 1990s.
12The ¯rst-order autocorrelation of investor °ows is also of interest. The positive au-
tocorrelation found in the aggregate net °ows of mutual funds can solely be attributed
to the group of households. Insurance companies and pension funds show no signi¯cant
autocorrelation and ¯nancial corporations show a slightly negative coe±cient of lagged
°ows, which, however, is only signi¯cantly di®erent from zero at a ten percent level. This
result is robust for all speci¯cations and economically meaningful. All other things being
equal, a fund that experienced an increase in retail °ows of 10 percentage points in the
previous quarter grows in the current quarter by an additional 2.6 percentage points. The
autocorrelation in retail °ows can be explained by unobserved factors such as distribution
channels of the fund family, advertising or simply status quo bias (see e.g. Patel et al.
1991, Goetzmann & Peles 1997, Kempf & Ruenzi 2006). Thus, the autocorrelation of
retail °ows is a sign for unsophisticated investors among the group of retail investors. An
alternative explanation is that retail investors are disadvantaged through high transaction
costs, and thus choose to invest continuously in the same fund (e.g. through a savings
plan).
The convex °ow-performance relationship in total °ows can be seen by the fact that
withdrawals in the low performance segment are not as strong as performance chasing in
the high performance segment. In addition, when comparing the three investor groups,
di®erences in °ow-performance sensitivity in the low performance segment are not as
pronounced as for the high performance segment. Only ¯nancial corporations show sig-
ni¯cant out°ows from the worst performing funds, when using risk adjusted performance
measures. These ¯ndings have to be interpreted with caution since the °ows of institu-
tional investors show a high variation and these results might be driven by rather extreme
°ows.
In summary, the results mainly support the ¯rst hypothesis. Sophisticated investors
account for a larger percentage of cash °ows into well performing funds than disadvantaged
investors do. Financial corporations, arguably the most sophisticated investors, chase past
performance to the greatest extent. Insurance companies and pension funds, a group of
13investors that might be institutionally disadvantaged, show a lower tendency to chase
past performance. The results of households as a group are mixed. On the one hand they
seem to be sophisticated, on the other hand some °ows seem to be driven by advertising
or status quo bias. This result is in line with Malloy & Zhu (2004), who ¯nd clientele
di®erences among retail investors. There is some evidence that ¯nancial corporations
punish poor performance by withdrawing their money from low performing funds.
As we see in Table 4, insurance companies and pension funds do not invest in all
mutual funds of the sample. They invest only in 968 out of 1350 funds, which is about 71
percent of the sample. Omitting this fact might bias the results of the °ow-performance
relationship. To address this potential selection bias I will model both the decision to
invest in a fund or not and the decision regarding how much to invest in the fund (°ow
regression) simultaneously in the next section using a Heckman selection model.6
4.2 The Investment Decisions of Insurance Companies and Pen-
sion Funds
The investment decisions of insurance companies and pension funds are di®erent to those
of households and ¯nancial corporations. While ¯nancial corporations and households can
decide on their own, insurance companies and pension funds are regulated by the Federal
Financial Supervisory Authority (BaFin) and have to prove that their investments in mu-
tual funds comply with prudent-man principles. If these principles are violated, insurance
companies and pension funds are not allowed to invest in the fund. This regulation might
be the reason why there are no insurances and pension funds in one third of the funds
in the sample. Thus, the decision of insurance companies and pension funds is twofold:
¯rst, whether they can invest in the fund or not; and second, how much they invest in
the funds they are allowed to invest in.
6I also run a Heckman selection model for the group of ¯nancial corporations as a robustness check.
The results of the Heckman model are very similar to the pooled OLS approach. The Heckman selection
model is not feasible for households, since the number of funds that lack private investors is not su±cient.
14To capture this two-part decision process I run a Heckman (1979) selection model.
The °ow-performance regression for insurance companies and pension funds is speci¯ed
as before:
Flowi;j;t = ¯0 + ¯1Lowi;t¡1 + ¯2Midi;t¡1 + ¯3Highi;t¡1 (6)
+ ¯4Controlsi;t¡1 + "1;i;j;t;
however, °ows are only observed if insurance companies and pension funds decided to
invest in the mutual fund or are not restricted from investing in this fund. This is the
case if the following condition is ful¯lled:





The explanatory variables of the selection equation are past performance, measured by
the performance ranking over an evaluation period of 24 months, volatility also measured
over the past 24 months, and the age and size of the fund. Furthermore, dummy variables
indicating the investment objective and time dummies are included, but not reported. I
estimate the Heckman two equation model using maximum likelihood. Results for the
three di®erent performance measures are displayed in Table 5.
The ¯rst column of each speci¯cation (FLOW) shows the °ow-performance relation-
ship already estimated (Eq. 6). The second column of each speci¯cation (SELECT)
displays the results of the selection equation, the decision of the insurance companies
and pension funds on whether to invest in the fund (Eq. 7). The estimation results are
15virtually the same as before. Insurance companies and pension funds show a tendency to
chase past performance, although not for all performance measures.
In the Heckman selection model a self-selection bias arises only if the correlation ½
between the residuals of equation (6) and (7) is not equal to zero. As can be seen from
Table 5, the null hypothesis that ½ is equal to zero cannot be rejected on all conventional
signi¯cance levels. Thus, a separate estimation, as carried out before, delivers already
unbiased estimates.
Nevertheless, the selection equation provides some interesting insights. The probabil-
ity of insurance companies and pension funds investing in a mutual fund decreases if the
fund is a high performer. This result is in line with the avoidance of risk required by
the prudent-man principles. High volatility, on the other hand, has no signi¯cant e®ect
on the probability of insurance companies and pension funds investing in mutual funds.
Moreover, insurance companies and pension funds tend to invest in older and larger funds,
which can be interpreted as the fund having a long and good reputation, but it should
also be borne in mind that only a long record makes it possible for insurance companies
and pension funds to provide evidence of the security of the mutual fund to the regulator.
The positive coe±cient for fund fees might also indicate that insurance companies and
pension funds see these funds as high quality funds. Or to put it di®erently: a high quality
fund, which has maybe even received a quality rating, is simply able to charge a higher
fee.
To quantify the e®ect of the explanatory variables on the probability of insurance
companies and pension funds investing in a mutual fund I provide marginal e®ects of a
Probit model. Since the residuals of the °ow regression are uncorrelated with the residuals
of the selection regression, a two-part model, i.e. separately running a Probit model and
OLS regression, also yields unbiased results. Table 6 reports the marginal e®ects of the
Probit model evaluated at the mean of the explanatory variables.
In summary, insurance companies show signs of performance chasing, although regula-
tions seem to hinder them from investing in all mutual funds. Overall, the disaggregation
16of the °ow-performance relationship in their investor types supports the theory of Gruber
(1996) and Berk & Green (2004); however, the results provide no clear-cut evidence of
whether one group is punishing bad performance more severely. Only in some speci¯-
cations do ¯nancial corporations show a signi¯cant °ow-performance relationship in the
lower segment. These results should be interpreted with caution since the fund °ows,
especially institutional °ows, show very extreme values (see Table 2). The results of the
°ow-performance regression could accordingly be driven by a few extreme °ows. There-
fore, in the next section I will analyze the percentage holdings of investors. A di®erence
in the °ow-performance relationship should also become apparent in the stock of shares
held by the di®erent investor groups.
5 Mutual Fund Investor Composition
5.1 Investor Composition by Quintile
If all investors react in the same way to performance there should be no systematic dif-
ference in the percentage of shares held by investor groups in well or poorly performing
funds. In contrast, if there are sophisticated investors and disadvantaged investors, the
investor compositions for well and poorly performing funds should be di®erent. Sophis-
ticated investors learn about managerial ability and will increase their °ows into high
performing funds, which should consequently increase the percentage of shares held by
sophisticated investors in top performing funds. By the same token there should be an
increased percentage of disadvantaged investors in the worst performing funds.
In order to test this hypothesis I rank mutual funds according to their past performance
within their investment objective and form ¯ve quintiles. In each quintile I determine the
average size measured by the total net assets (TNA) of the fund and the average share
of each investor group. The results can be found in Table 7. The di®erence in means
between the groups is tested using a t-test. I test the di®erences between the top and
bottom quintile (5-1), the 5th and 4th quintile (5-4) and the 2nd and 1st quintile (2-1).
17The worst performing funds (bottom quintile) are much smaller on average than the
better performing funds. Fund size increases with performance, but the top performing
funds are slightly smaller on average than the fourth quintile in two out of three cases.
This result is in line with the theoretical model by Berk & Green (2004), who argue that
there are economies of scale in managerial ability.
The percentage share held by households is slightly higher for the worst performing
funds than the top performing funds. This ¯nding is in line with the previous results.
Households do chase returns to some extent, but, in addition, other factors such as ad-
vertising might play an important role in the fund selection process.
The previous ¯nding for ¯nancial corporations can also be con¯rmed. Financial cor-
porations show the strongest tendency to chase past performance. The share of ¯nancial
corporations in the top performing funds is therefore 19 while the worst performing funds
only contain 13 percent on average (Panel A). Moreover, the di®erence between the top
quintile and the second best quintile is distinct. The share of ¯nancial corporations in-
creases by 6 percentage points from the 4th to the 5th quintile.
The group of insurance corporations and pension funds is clearly underrepresented
in the top performing funds, even though there is some evidence of performance chasing
for this investor group. Insurance companies and pension funds do not hold any shares
in many of the better performing funds, which results in the large di®erence in means
between the top two and the bottom three quintiles.
While this test shows distinct di®erences in investor composition between top perform-
ing funds and average funds, there is no clear di®erence between the worst performing
funds and average funds. Even though the average size of mutual funds decreases from
260 million to 182 million Euro from the second to the ¯rst quintile (Panel A), the investor
composition between the second and ¯rst quintile does not change considerably. Only the
di®erence in mean shares for households is statistically signi¯cant, when comparing the
second versus the ¯rst quintile. However, when testing against the 3rd or 4th quintile this
di®erence becomes insigni¯cant (not reported). This result implies that the speed with
18which households, ¯nancial corporations, and insurance companies and pension funds
leave the worst performing funds does not di®er signi¯cantly.
5.2 Investor Composition: Robustness Checks
Since other factors might in°uence the percentage share held by one investor group I run
a multivariate regression as a robustness check. I construct a dummy variable Quintile 1
that is one if the fund's performance is in the ¯rst quintile and zero otherwise. Dummies
for the other quintiles are constructed in the same way.
Table 1 shows that the holding structure of mutual fund investors changed over time.
To account for the changing investor composition over time, I include time dummies as
a control in the regression. Furthermore, di®erent investor groups might have di®erent
preferences regarding the investment objective of the fund. This is controlled for by also
including dummies for the fund investment objective. Additional controls are the funds'
volatility, fees, size and age.
I run a regression of percentage shares of investor groups on the quintile dummies and
the mentioned controls. The omitted category is the 3rd quintile. Thus, the coe±cients of
the dummy variables measure the di®erence relative to a fund with average performance.
The results are essentially the same as for the univariate test. Most importantly, ¯nancial
corporations hold a signi¯cantly higher share in the top performing funds than a fund with
average performance. The composition of the worst performing funds, in contrast, does
not systematically di®er from the investor composition of the average fund. The ¯nding
of the °ow-performance regression that ¯nancial corporations punish poorly performing
funds more quickly is not con¯rmed when looking at the investor compositions. The
signi¯cant °ow-performance relationship in the low segment is thus most likely driven by
only a few observations.
Furthermore, ¯nancial corporations seem to be less risk averse since their share is
greater in funds with higher volatility. In addition, younger funds have an increased share
of ¯nancial corporations as investors. One possible explanation is that ¯nancial corpo-
19rations have better inside knowledge about the fund manager's ability and are therefore
willing to buy younger funds.
Looking at the investor composition of mutual funds provides an additional test for
the theory of Gruber (1996) and Berk & Green (2004). While this test provides evidence
that sophisticated investors hold higher percentage shares in the best performing funds,
the test cannot detect any systematic di®erence in investor composition between the
worst performing funds and those with average performance. Thus, we do not observe
a \burnout", where sophisticated investors exit poorly performing funds ¯rst and only
disadvantaged and unsophisticated investors stay behind. The results are more in line
with Lynch & Musto (2003), who argue that investors do not respond to poor performance,
because they expect the management strategy or the management team to change.
6 Conclusion
Chasing past performance of mutual funds is often explained by asymmetric information
or behavioral arguments. Gruber (1996) and Berk & Green (2004) provide an alternative
explanation for this phenomenon. Sophisticated investors rationally chase past perfor-
mance, because high past performance is a signal for managerial ability.
This paper provides a direct test of this theory by examining the °ow-performance
relationship of di®erent investor groups in German mutual funds. The ¯ndings overall
support the theory of Gruber (1996) and Berk & Green (2004). Financial corporations,
arguably the most sophisticated investor group, have a strong tendency to chase past
performance. The group of households comprises both sophisticated investors, who chase
past performance, and unsophisticated investors, whose investment decision is driven by
advertising or status quo bias. Insurance companies and pension funds show signs of being
institutionally disadvantaged. There is some evidence that this investor group chases
past performance, but they are underrepresented in the best performing funds, probably
due to investment restrictions. Surprisingly, I ¯nd no signi¯cant di®erence between the
20investor composition of the worst performing funds and those with average performance.
These results provide new insights into the investment decisions of di®erent mutual fund
investors and the di®erent °ow-performance relationships of investor groups.
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24Table 1: Sample Summary Statistics
This table shows summary statistics of the mutual fund data set at the end of each year.
First, it shows the total number of funds and the number of funds in each investment
objective (Germany, Europe and Global). Second, it shows other averages of mutual fund
characteristics: TNA are the total net assets in million Euro. Expense ratio is the average
expenses per year divided by average total net assets. Total load includes front-end and back-
end loads. Age is the age since inception in years. Return is the 12-month return in percent.
The standard deviation is calculated using monthly returns from the past 12 months. Third,
it displays the number of funds with depositor information available and the value-weighted
percentage shares by the depositor groups (Households, Financial Corporations, Insurance
Companies and Pension Funds and Other Investors).
Year 2005 2006 2007 2008
Total 239 246 247 243
Germany 50 52 50 46
Europe 106 108 111 109
Global 83 86 86 88
TNA (Million EUR) 328.9 357.9 358.8 197.3
Expense Ratio (%) 1.42 1.35 1.37 1.40
Total Load (%) 4.08 3.87 3.98 3.94
Age (Years) 11.53 11.83 12.30 12.48
Return (%) 24.06 15.30 4.52 -37.94
Std. Deviation (monthly returns) 3.39 2.98 3.02 5.93
Funds with Depositor Information 159 172 221 225
Coverage (%) 66.5 69.9 89.5 92.6
Households (%) 70.9 64.4 59.2 58.1
Financial Corporations (%) 11.3 17.0 14.3 14.2
Insurance companies and Pension Funds (%) 12.7 12.3 19.7 22.0
Other (%) 5.1 6.3 6.8 5.7
25Table 2: Descriptive Statistics of Investor Flows
This table shows descriptive statistics of quarterly °ows by investor type. Flows are the change in shares
as a percentage of the number of shares held in the previous period. All reported measures are time series
averages of the cross-sectional measures.
Percentiles
Mean Std. Dev. 10th 25th 50th 75th 90th
Total -2.41 10.88 -11.92 -6.18 -2.63 0.06 6.40
Households -3.30 8.50 -10.53 -5.96 -3.66 -1.21 2.94
Financial Corporations 10.00 80.29 -36.83 -13.03 -1.60 6.83 44.96
Insurance Companies and 3.63 38.53 -6.19 -0.13 0.71 3.81 13.58
Pension Funds
Table 3: Correlations between Investor Flows
This table shows time series averages of pairwise correlation coe±cients between total °ows and °ows of
di®erent investor groups. Flows are the change in shares as a percentage of the number of shares held
in the previous period.
Total Financial Insur. Companies and
Households Corporations Pension Funds
Total 1.000
Households 0.554 1.000
Financial 0.363 0.075 1.000
Corporations
Insurance Companies and 0.200 0.044 0.049 1.000
Pension Funds
26Table 4: Flow-Performance Relationship
This table shows the e®ect of past performance on total net °ows and net °ows separated by investor
type. All explanatory variables are lagged and, in addition, the regression includes time dummies
and dummies for the investment objective, which are not reported. Performance is measured by
Raw Return, Sharpe Ratio and Jensen's Alpha (Panel A, B and C) calculated over the past 24
months. Quarterly °ows are regressed on low, mid and high performance ranges and controls.
Lagged °ow is the °ow of the previous quarter, volatility is measured as the standard deviation
over the performance evaluation period, total fee is the expense ratio plus 1/3 of total loads, size
is measured by the natural logarithm of assets and age is the natural logarithm of one plus age in
years. Robust standard errors clustered at the fund level are given in parentheses. *, **, and ***
indicate signi¯cance at the 10%, 5% and 1% level respectively.
Panel A: Raw Return
Financial Insur. Companies
Total Households Corporations & Pension Funds
Low 18.00*** 4.80 33.36 33.80
(6.86) (5.29) (37.62) (24.54)
Mid -1.15 0.66 -0.72 -3.08
(1.57) (1.40) (11.75) (4.68)
High 37.79*** 15.72** 120.45* 80.17**
(12.84) (7.42) (68.01) (39.36)
Lagged Flow 0.13*** 0.26*** -0.06* 0.05
(0.05) (0.07) (0.03) (0.04)
Volatility -1.39* -0.64 -5.04 -2.81
(0.84) (0.76) (3.50) (3.40)
Total Fee -1.49*** -0.95** -4.84 1.59
(0.57) (0.40) (3.47) (2.16)
Size -0.11 -0.04 -1.25 0.30
(0.23) (0.16) (1.40) (1.10)
Age 0.52 0.11 -1.00 -2.59
(0.62) (0.48) (4.14) (2.08)
Constant 5.21 4.67 73.28* 1.24
(5.23) (5.04) (42.28) (23.26)
Observations 1350 1317 1262 968
R-squared 0.094 0.125 0.021 0.043
(continued)
27Table 4 -Continued
Panel B: Sharpe Ratio
Financial Insur. Companies
Total Households Corporations & Pension Funds
Low 18.03*** 7.17 106.90** 33.91
(6.41) (4.50) (48.54) (26.08)
Mid -1.15 0.17 -23.13 -5.29
(1.56) (1.27) (14.65) (6.21)
High 34.19*** 17.50** 157.21** 33.90
(11.11) (7.24) (66.40) (28.99)
Lagged Flow 0.14*** 0.26*** -0.06* 0.05
(0.05) (0.07) (0.03) (0.04)
Volatility -0.31 -0.04 -1.28 -1.26
(0.84) (0.67) (3.60) (3.34)
Total Fee -1.35** -0.89** -4.67 1.81
(0.57) (0.40) (3.47) (2.23)
Size -0.07 -0.03 -0.94 0.70
(0.23) (0.15) (1.38) (1.02)
Age 0.41 0.09 -1.31 -3.18
(0.61) (0.47) (4.10) (2.04)
Constant 0.83 0.96 40.16 -9.54
(4.98) (4.58) (41.18) (22.06)
Observations 1350 1317 1262 968
R-squared 0.093 0.128 0.024 0.037
(continued)
28Table 4 -Continued
Panel C: Jensen's Alpha
Financial Insur. Companies
Total Households Corporations & Pension Funds
Low 16.35** 4.61 91.13** 28.02
(6.69) (4.98) (42.98) (30.59)
Mid -0.50 0.30 -17.72 -7.94
(1.48) (1.27) (14.55) (8.11)
High 27.47** 17.26** 124.01** 42.41*
(10.59) (6.80) (53.91) (23.86)
Lagged Flow 0.14*** 0.26*** -0.06* 0.05
(0.05) (0.07) (0.03) (0.04)
Volatility -0.62 -0.29 -2.28 -1.64
(0.83) (0.70) (3.28) (3.38)
Total Fee -1.47*** -0.97** -5.13 1.51
(0.56) (0.40) (3.62) (2.32)
Size -0.05 -0.02 -0.88 0.78
(0.23) (0.15) (1.37) (0.98)
Age 0.35 0.12 -1.63 -3.03
(0.62) (0.48) (4.16) (2.03)
Constant 2.24 2.63 48.84 -7.63
(5.28) (4.89) (40.71) (20.99)
Observations 1350 1317 1262 968
R-squared 0.087 0.127 0.021 0.037
29Table 5: The Investment Decisions of Insurance Companies and
Pension Funds
This table shows the investment decision of insurance companies and pension funds estimated using a
Heckman selection model. The column FLOW indicates the °ow-performance regression, where °ows
of insurance companies and pension funds are regressed on performance measures (Low, Mid and High)
and controls. The control variables are de¯ned as before (see Table 4). SELECT indicates the selection
equation that models whether insurances and pension funds decide to invest in a fund or not. Explanatory
variables for the selection equation are performance measured by the percentile rank and the control
variables as before. The model is estimated by maximum likelihood. Robust standard errors clustered
at the fund level are given in parentheses. *, **, and *** indicate signi¯cance at the 10%, 5% and 1%
level respectively.
Raw Return Sharpe Ratio Jensen's Alpha
FLOW SELECT FLOW SELECT FLOW SELECT
Low 33.80 33.92 28.05
(24.28) (25.81) (30.30)
Mid -3.05 -5.22 -7.86
(4.61) (6.10) (7.94)
High 80.14** 33.91 42.38*
(38.95) (28.69) (23.59)
Performance Rank -0.46*** -0.52*** -0.55***
(0.17) (0.18) (0.17)
Lagged Flow 0.05 0.05 0.05
(0.04) (0.04) (0.04)
Volatility -2.81 -0.12 -1.24 -0.20 -1.62 -0.19
(3.37) (0.13) (3.30) (0.13) (3.35) (0.13)
Total Fee 1.57 0.66*** 1.73 0.64*** 1.43 0.65***
(2.21) (0.11) (2.27) (0.11) (2.37) (0.11)
Size 0.28 0.40*** 0.67 0.40*** 0.74 0.40***
(1.12) (0.04) (1.04) (0.04) (1.00) (0.04)
Age -2.59 0.27*** -3.20 0.27*** -3.05 0.27***
(2.05) (0.10) (2.01) (0.10) (2.00) (0.10)
Constant 1.60 -8.39*** -8.66 -8.12*** -6.65 -8.15***
(23.80) (1.03) (22.53) (1.03) (21.53) (1.03)
¸ = ½¾ -0.11 -0.26 -0.29
(0.80) (0.76) (0.81)
Observations 1350 1350 1350
Log Likelihood -5444 -5445 -5445
Wald test: ½ = 0 0.02 0.13 0.15
p-value 0.89 0.72 0.70
30Table 6: The Investment Decisions of Insurance Companies and
Pension Funds: Probit-Model
This table shows the marginal e®ects of a Probit regression of the decision whether
insurance companies and pension funds invest in a mutual fund or not. The dependent
variable is a dummy that is one if insurance companies and pension funds invested
in the mutual fund and zero otherwise. Explanatory variables are de¯ned as before
(see Table 4). Marginal e®ects are evaluated at the mean. Robust standard errors
clustered at the fund level are given in parentheses. *, **, and *** indicate signi¯cance
at the 10%, 5% and 1% level respectively.
Raw Return Sharpe Ratio Jensen's Alpha
Performance Rank -0.11 -0.12 -0.13*
(0.08) (0.08) (0.07)
Volatility -0.03 -0.05 -0.05
(0.06) (0.06) (0.06)
Total Fee 0.18*** 0.18*** 0.18***
(0.05) (0.05) (0.05)
Size 0.11*** 0.11*** 0.11***
(0.02) (0.02) (0.02)
Age 0.07 0.07 0.07
(0.06) (0.06) (0.06)
Observations 1350 1350 1350
31Table 7: Investor Composition by Performance
This table shows the average total net assets in million EUR (TNA) and the average share (as percentage
of total net assets) held by the three major investor groups. Funds were ranked within their investment
objective into quintiles by their prior 24-month Raw Return, Sharpe Ratio and Jensen's Alpha. Total
net assets are measured in million Euro, shares of the investor groups are in percent. Moreover, the
table displays the total average over the whole sample. In addition, it provides the di®erences in means
between the 5th and 1st quintile (5-1), the 5th and 4th quintile (5-4) and the 2nd and 1st quintile (2-1).
The p-values of a t-test of equality in means are given in parentheses.
Panel A: Raw Return
Financial Insur. Companies
TNA Households Corporations & Pension Funds
1 (Bottom) 182.7 66.3 10.8 17.3
2 259.6 61.7 9.7 19.7
3 490.7 65.2 11.9 15.9
4 593.7 67.3 12.8 13.2
5 (Top) 414.0 58.8 19.2 11.8
Total 390.2 64.0 12.8 15.6
5-1: 231.3 -7.6 8.4 -5.5
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.003)
5-4: -179.7 -8.5 6.4 -1.4
(0.008) (0.000) (0.000) (0.428)
2-1: 76.9 -4.7 -1.1 2.4
(0.042) (0.046) (0.443) (0.255)
(continued)
32Table 7 -Continued
Panel B: Sharpe Ratio
Financial Insur. Companies
TNA Households Corporations & Pension Funds
1 (Bottom) 177.3 66.5 11.1 16.1
2 261.4 61.5 10.9 19.7
3 507.1 65.3 11.4 17.2
4 562.0 65.1 12.4 14.6
5 (Top) 445.3 61.5 18.0 10.4
Total 390.2 64.0 12.8 15.6
5-1: 267.9 -5.0 6.9 -5.7
(0.000) (0.022) (0.000) (0.001)
5-4: -116.7 -3.7 5.6 -4.2
(0.100) (0.110) (0.000) (0.019)
2-1: 84.1 -5.0 -0.2 3.6
(0.014) (0.027) (0.891) (0.079)
(continued)
33Table 7 -Continued
Panel C: Jensen's Alpha
Financial Insur. Companies
TNA Households Corporations & Pension Funds
1 (Bottom) 193.1 67.3 10.8 16.3
2 298.2 61.2 10.4 20.2
3 435.6 66.4 11.1 16.5
4 529.2 62.2 14.1 15.0
5 (Top) 495.1 62.4 17.5 10.1
Total 390.2 64.0 12.8 15.6
5-1: 302.0 -4.9 6.7 -6.2
(0.000) (0.020) (0.000) (0.000)
5-4: -34.1 0.2 3.5 -4.9
(0.633) (0.922) (0.015) (0.007)
2-1: 105.2 -6.1 -0.4 3.9
(0.008) (0.008) (0.795) (0.053)
34Table 8: Investor Composition by Performance: Regression Results
This table shows the regression results of the share of depositor group on lagged performance and
lagged control variables. Quintile 1 is a dummy variable that is equal to one if the fund is in the
¯rst performance quintile and zero otherwise. Quintile 2 - Quintile 5 are constructed in the same
way. The omitted category is the 3rd quintile. Volatility is measured as the standard deviation over
the performance evaluation period (24 months), total fee is the expense ratio plus 1/3 of total loads,
size is measured by the natural logarithm of assets and age is the natural logarithm of one plus age
in years. All speci¯cations include time and investment objective ¯xed e®ects. Robust standard
errors clustered at the fund level are given in parentheses. *, **, and *** indicate signi¯cance at
the 10%, 5% and 1% level respectively.
Panel A: Raw Return
Financial Insur. Companies
Households Corporations & Pension Funds
Quintile 1 -0.66 -0.54 2.04
(4.08) (2.50) (3.43)
Quintile 2 -3.93 -2.23 4.51*
(3.37) (1.51) (2.46)
Quintile 4 2.02 0.72 -2.58
(3.00) (1.60) (2.21)
Quintile 5 -5.65 4.78** -3.15
(3.58) (2.13) (3.11)
Volatility -2.16 7.41*** -2.11
(4.05) (2.61) (2.70)
Total Fee 0.49 -1.35 5.23**
(3.19) (1.75) (2.11)
Size -1.43 0.80 0.83
(1.18) (0.71) (0.93)
Age 4.08 -6.41*** 3.55
(3.25) (1.84) (3.08)
Constant 93.86*** -24.45 -8.99
(34.13) (18.57) (25.39)
Time Fixed E®ects Yes Yes Yes
Inv. Obj. Fixed E®ects Yes Yes Yes
Observations 1655 1655 1655
R-squared 0.053 0.143 0.080
(continued)
35Table 8 -Continued
Panel B: Sharpe Ratio
Financial Insur. Companies
Households Corporations & Pension Funds
Quintile 1 0.16 -0.53 -0.23
(3.92) (2.44) (3.37)
Quintile 2 -4.30 -0.58 3.10
(3.03) (1.45) (2.74)
Quintile 4 -0.45 1.13 -2.48
(2.68) (1.33) (2.18)
Quintile 5 -3.33 5.70*** -5.38*
(3.16) (1.76) (2.79)
Volatility -2.87 9.15*** -3.99
(4.07) (2.64) (2.66)
Total Fee 0.38 -1.06 5.07**
(3.22) (1.75) (2.14)
Size -1.49 0.80 0.82
(1.20) (0.69) (0.94)
Age 4.43 -6.35*** 3.23
(3.27) (1.82) (3.09)
Constant 98.18*** -35.01* 3.25
(34.70) (18.04) (26.00)
Time Fixed E®ects Yes Yes Yes
Inv. Obj. Fixed E®ects Yes Yes Yes
Observations 1655 1655 1655
R-squared 0.049 0.145 0.080
(continued)
36Table 8 -Continued
Panel C: Jensen's Alpha
Financial Insur. Companies
Households Corporations & Pension Funds
Quintile 1 0.71 -1.32 0.66
(4.09) (2.40) (3.46)
Quintile 2 -5.63* -0.89 4.73*
(3.14) (1.53) (2.75)
Quintile 4 -3.34 2.13* -0.41
(2.61) (1.28) (2.24)
Quintile 5 -3.31 4.66*** -4.92*
(3.25) (1.78) (2.82)
Volatility -3.01 8.65*** -3.20
(4.01) (2.63) (2.64)
Total Fee 0.26 -1.10 5.20**
(3.21) (1.75) (2.17)
Size -1.42 0.74 0.87
(1.19) (0.70) (0.93)
Age 4.54 -6.37*** 3.10
(3.30) (1.83) (3.10)
Constant 98.23*** -30.97* -2.70
(33.98) (17.95) (25.34)
Time Fixed E®ects Yes Yes Yes
Inv. Obj. Fixed E®ects Yes Yes Yes
Observations 1655 1655 1655




















CFR Working Papers are available for download from www.cfr-cologne.de. 
 
Hardcopies can be ordered from: Centre for Financial Research (CFR),  




















J. Hengelbrock,  









Are There Disadvantaged Clienteles in Mutual Funds? 
 
























G. Cici, S. Gibson,  
J.J. Merrick Jr. 
 
V. Agarwal, W. H. Fung, 
Y. C. Loon, N. Y. Naik 
 
G. Cici, S. Gibson 
 
 
D. Hess, D. Kreutzmann, 
O. Pucker 
 
S. Jank, M. Wedow 
 
Missing the Marks? Dispersion in Corporate Bond Valuations 
Across Mutual Funds 
 
Risk and Return in Convertible Arbitrage: Evidence from the 
Convertible Bond Market 
 
The Performance of Corporate-Bond Mutual Funds:  
Evidence Based on Security-Level Holdings 
 
Projected Earnings Accuracy and the Profitability of Stock 
Recommendations 
 
Sturm und Drang in Money Market Funds: When Money 
Market Funds Cease to Be Narrow 
    
10-15  G. Cici, A. Kempf, A. 
Puetz 
Caught in the Act:  
How Hedge Funds Manipulate their Equity Positions 
    
10-14  J. Grammig, S. Jank  Creative Destruction and Asset Prices 
    
10-13  S. Jank, M. Wedow  Purchase and Redemption Decisions of Mutual Fund 
Investors and the Role of Fund Families 
    
10-12  S. Artmann, P. Finter, 
A. Kempf, S. Koch,  
E. Theissen 
The Cross-Section of German Stock Returns: 
New Data and New Evidence 
    
10-11  M. Chesney, A. Kempf  The Value of Tradeability 
    
10-10  S. Frey, P. Herbst  The Influence of Buy-side Analysts on 
Mutual Fund Trading 
    
10-09  V. Agarwal, W. Jiang, 
Y. Tang, B. Yang 
Uncovering Hedge Fund Skill from the Portfolio Holdings They 
Hide 
    10-08  V. Agarwal, V. Fos,  
W. Jiang 
Inferring Reporting Biases in Hedge Fund Databases from 
Hedge Fund Equity Holdings 
    
10-07  V. Agarwal, G. Bakshi,  
J. Huij 
Do Higher-Moment Equity Risks Explain Hedge Fund 
Returns? 
    
10-06  J. Grammig, F. J. Peter  Tell-Tale Tails 
    
10-05  K. Drachter, A. Kempf  Höhe, Struktur und Determinanten der Managervergütung- 
Eine Analyse der Fondsbranche in Deutschland 
    
10-04  J. Fang, A. Kempf,  
M. Trapp  
Fund Manager Allocation 
    
10-03  P. Finter, A. Niessen-
Ruenzi, S. Ruenzi 
The Impact of Investor Sentiment on the German Stock Market
    
10-02  D. Hunter, E. Kandel,  
S. Kandel, R. Wermers 
Endogenous Benchmarks 
    
10-01  S. Artmann, P. Finter,  
A. Kempf 
Determinants of Expected Stock Returns: Large Sample 










Price Discovery in Spot and Futures Markets: 
A Reconsideration 
    
09-16  M. Trapp  Trading the Bond-CDS Basis – The Role of Credit Risk  
and Liquidity 
    
09-14  A. Kempf, O. Korn, 
M. Uhrig-Homburg 
The Term Structure of Illiquidity Premia 
    
09-13  W. Bühler, M. Trapp  Time-Varying Credit Risk and Liquidity Premia in Bond and 
CDS Markets 
    
09-12  W. Bühler, M. Trapp 
 
Explaining the Bond-CDS Basis – The Role of Credit Risk and 
Liquidity 
    
09-11  S. J. Taylor, P. K. Yadav,  
Y. Zhang 
Cross-sectional analysis of risk-neutral skewness 
    
09-10  A. Kempf, C. Merkle,  
A. Niessen 
Low Risk and High Return - How Emotions Shape 
Expectations on the Stock Market 
    
09-09  V. Fotak, V. Raman,  
P. K. Yadav 
Naked Short Selling: The Emperor`s New Clothes? 
    
09-08  F. Bardong, S.M. Bartram,  
P.K. Yadav 
Informed Trading, Information Asymmetry and Pricing of 
Information Risk: Empirical Evidence from the NYSE 
    
09-07  S. J. Taylor , P. K. Yadav, 
Y. Zhang 
The information content of implied volatilities and model-free 
volatility expectations: Evidence from options written on 
individual stocks 
    
09-06  S. Frey, P. Sandas  The Impact of Iceberg Orders in Limit Order Books 
    
09-05  H. Beltran-Lopez, P. Giot, 
J. Grammig 
Commonalities in the Order Book 
    
09-04  J. Fang, S. Ruenzi  Rapid Trading bei deutschen Aktienfonds: 
Evidenz aus einer großen deutschen Fondsgesellschaft 
    
09-03  A. Banegas, B. Gillen,      
A. Timmermann,  
R. Wermers 
The Performance of European Equity Mutual Funds 
    
09-02  J. Grammig, A. Schrimpf,  Long-Horizon Consumption Risk and the Cross-Section  M. Schuppli  of Returns: New Tests and International Evidence 
    
09-01  O. Korn, P. Koziol  The Term Structure of Currency Hedge Ratios 








U. Bonenkamp,                
C. Homburg, A. Kempf    
 
Fundamental Information in Technical Trading Strategies 
    
08-11  O. Korn  Risk Management with Default-risky Forwards 
    
08-10   J. Grammig, F.J. Peter  International Price Discovery in the Presence 
of Market Microstructure Effects 
    
08-09  C. M. Kuhnen, A. Niessen  Public Opinion and Executive Compensation 
    
08-08  A. Pütz, S. Ruenzi  Overconfidence among Professional Investors: Evidence from 
Mutual Fund Managers 
    
08-07  P. Osthoff  What matters to SRI investors? 











A. Betzer, E. Theissen 
 
 




N. Hautsch, D. Hess,  
C. Müller 
 
Sooner Or Later: Delays in Trade Reporting by Corporate 
Insiders 
 
Determinanten der Aktionärspräsenz auf 
Hauptversammlungen deutscher Aktiengesellschaften 
 
 
Price Adjustment to News with Uncertain Precision 
    
08-03  D. Hess, H. Huang,  
A. Niessen 
How Do Commodity Futures Respond to Macroeconomic 
News? 
    
08-02 R.  Chakrabarti,   
W. Megginson, P. Yadav 
Corporate Governance in India 
 
    









M. Bär, A. Niessen,  
S. Ruenzi 
 
The Impact of Work Group Diversity on Performance: 
Large Sample Evidence from the Mutual Fund Industry 
    
07-15  A. Niessen, S. Ruenzi  Political Connectedness and Firm Performance:  
Evidence From Germany 
    
07-14  O. Korn  Hedging Price Risk when Payment Dates are Uncertain 
    
07-13  A. Kempf, P. Osthoff  SRI Funds: Nomen est Omen 
    
07-12  J. Grammig, E. Theissen, 
O. Wuensche 
Time and Price Impact of a Trade: A Structural Approach 
    
07-11  V. Agarwal, J. R. Kale  On the Relative Performance of Multi-Strategy and Funds of 
Hedge Funds 
    
07-10 M.  Kasch-Haroutounian, 
E. Theissen 
Competition Between Exchanges: Euronext versus Xetra 
    
07-09  V. Agarwal, N. D. Daniel, 
N. Y. Naik 
Do hedge funds manage their reported returns?  
 
    07-08  N. C. Brown, K. D. Wei,  
R. Wermers 
Analyst Recommendations, Mutual Fund Herding, and 
Overreaction in Stock Prices 
    
07-07  A. Betzer, E. Theissen  Insider Trading and Corporate Governance: 
The Case of Germany 
    
07-06  V. Agarwal, L. Wang  Transaction Costs and Value Premium 
    
07-05  J. Grammig, A. Schrimpf  Asset Pricing with a Reference Level of Consumption: 
New Evidence from the Cross-Section of Stock Returns 
    
07-04  V. Agarwal, N.M. Boyson, 
N.Y. Naik 
Hedge Funds for retail investors? 
An examination of hedged mutual funds 
    
07-03  D. Hess, A. Niessen   The Early News Catches the Attention: 
On the Relative Price Impact of Similar Economic Indicators 
    
07-02  A. Kempf, S. Ruenzi, 
T. Thiele  
Employment Risk, Compensation Incentives and Managerial 
Risk Taking - Evidence from the Mutual Fund Industry - 
    
07-01  M. Hagemeister, A. Kempf  CAPM und erwartete Renditen: Eine Untersuchung auf Basis 









S. Čeljo-Hörhager,  
A. Niessen 
 
How do Self-fulfilling Prophecies affect Financial Ratings? - An 
experimental study 
    
06-12  R. Wermers, Y. Wu,  
J. Zechner 
Portfolio Performance, Discount Dynamics, and the Turnover 
of Closed-End Fund Managers 
    
06-11  U. v. Lilienfeld-Toal, 
S. Ruenzi 
Why Managers Hold Shares of Their Firm: An Empirical 
Analysis 
 
06-10  A. Kempf, P. Osthoff  The Effect of Socially Responsible Investing on Portfolio 
Performance 
    
06-09  R. Wermers, T. Yao,  
J. Zhao 
The Investment Value of Mutual Fund Portfolio Disclosure 
    
06-08  M. Hoffmann, B. Kempa  The Poole Analysis in the New Open Economy 
Macroeconomic Framework 
 
06-07  K. Drachter, A. Kempf, 
M. Wagner 
Decision Processes in German Mutual Fund Companies: 
Evidence from a Telephone Survey 
    
06-06  J.P. Krahnen, F.A. 
Schmid, E. Theissen 
Investment Performance and Market Share: A Study of the 
German Mutual Fund Industry 
    
06-05  S. Ber, S. Ruenzi  On the Usability of Synthetic Measures of Mutual Fund Net-
Flows 
    
06-04  A. Kempf, D. Mayston  Liquidity Commonality Beyond Best Prices 
 
06-03  O. Korn, C. Koziol  Bond Portfolio Optimization: A Risk-Return Approach 
    
06-02  O. Scaillet, L. Barras, R. 
Wermers 
False Discoveries in Mutual Fund Performance: Measuring 
Luck in Estimated Alphas 
    











An Analysis of Private Investors´ Stock Market Return 
Forecasts 
    05-15  T. Foucault, S. Moinas,  
E. Theissen 
Does Anonymity Matter in Electronic Limit Order Markets 
    
05-14 R.  Kosowski,   
A. Timmermann,  
R. Wermers, H. White 
Can Mutual Fund „Stars“ Really Pick Stocks? 
New Evidence from a Bootstrap Analysis 
    
05-13  D. Avramov, R. Wermers  Investing in Mutual Funds when Returns are Predictable 
    
05-12  K. Griese, A. Kempf  Liquiditätsdynamik am deutschen Aktienmarkt 
    
05-11  S. Ber, A. Kempf,  
S. Ruenzi 
Determinanten der Mittelzuflüsse bei deutschen Aktienfonds 
    
05-10  M. Bär, A. Kempf,  
S. Ruenzi 
Is a Team Different From the Sum of Its Parts? 
Evidence from Mutual Fund Managers 
    
05-09  M. Hoffmann  Saving, Investment and the Net Foreign Asset Position 
    
05-08  S. Ruenzi  Mutual Fund Growth in Standard and Specialist Market 
Segments 
    
05-07  A. Kempf, S. Ruenzi  Status Quo Bias and the Number of Alternatives 
- An Empirical Illustration from the Mutual Fund  
Industry – 





J. Grammig,  
E. Theissen 
 
H. Beltran,  
J. Grammig,  
A.J. Menkveld 
Is Best Really Better? Internalization in Xetra BEST 
 
 
Understanding the Limit Order Book: Conditioning on Trade 
Informativeness 
    
05-04  M. Hoffmann  Compensating Wages under different Exchange rate Regimes 
    
05-03  M. Hoffmann  Fixed versus Flexible Exchange Rates: Evidence from 
Developing Countries 
    
05-02  A. Kempf, C. Memmel  On the Estimation of the Global Minimum Variance Portfolio 
    










N. Hautsch, D. Hess 
 
Bayesian Learning in Financial Markets – Testing for the 
Relevance of Information Precision in Price Discovery 
    
04-09 A.  Kempf,   
K. Kreuzberg 
Portfolio Disclosure, Portfolio Selection and Mutual Fund 
Performance Evaluation 
    
04-08  N.F. Carline, S.C. Linn, 
P.K. Yadav  
Operating performance changes associated with corporate 
mergers and the role of corporate governance 
    
04-07  J.J. Merrick, Jr., N.Y.  
Naik, P.K. Yadav 
Strategic Trading Behavior and Price Distortion in a 
Manipulated Market: Anatomy of a Squeeze  
    
04-06  N.Y. Naik, P.K. Yadav   Trading Costs of Public Investors with Obligatory and 
Voluntary Market-Making: Evidence from Market Reforms 
    
04-05  A. Kempf, S. Ruenzi  Family Matters: Rankings Within Fund Families and  
Fund Inflows 
    
04-04 V.  Agarwal,   
N.D. Daniel, N.Y. Naik 
Role of Managerial Incentives and Discretion in Hedge Fund 
Performance 
    
04-03  V. Agarwal, W.H. Fung, 
J.C. Loon, N.Y. Naik 
Liquidity Provision in the Convertible Bond Market:  
Analysis of Convertible Arbitrage Hedge Funds     
04-02  A. Kempf, S. Ruenzi  Tournaments in Mutual Fund Families 
    
04-01  I. Chowdhury, M. 
Hoffmann, A. Schabert 
Inflation Dynamics and the Cost Channel of Monetary 
Transmission 
 Cfr/University of cologne
Albertus-Magnus-Platz  
D-50923 Cologne
Fon +49(0)221-470-6995
Fax +49(0)221-470-3992
Kempf@cfr-Cologne.de
www.cfr-cologne.de